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Abstract
Classify simple games into sixteen “types” in terms of the four
conventional axioms: monotonicity, properness, strongness, and non-
weakness. Further classify them into sixty-four classes in terms of
finiteness (existence of a finite carrier) and algorithmic computability.
For each such class, we either show that it is empty or give an example
of a game belonging to it. We observe that if a type contains an infi-
nite game, then it contains both computable ones and noncomputable
ones. This strongly suggests that computability is logically, as well as
conceptually, unrelated to the conventional axioms.
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1 Introduction
Shortly after proposing four “independent” axioms characterizing simple
majority rule (May, 1952), May (1953) made a complete investigation of
the axioms. By a “complete investigation of the four axioms,” we mean an
investigation of all the sixteen (24) classes (of rules), formed by classifying
all the rules in terms of whether they satisfy each axiom.1 In particular, May
showed that the four axioms are “completely independent” in the sense that
each of the sixteen classes is nonempty.
In this paper, we provide a complete investigation of six axioms for sim-
ple games. A (simple) game2 is a coalitional game that assigns either 1
or 0 to each coalition—those assigned 1 are winning coalitions and those as-
signed 0 are losing coalitions. Among the six axioms, four are conventional:
monotonicity, properness, strongness, and nonweakness. These axioms clas-
sify games into sixteen (24) classes, which we call (conventional) types. The
other two are finiteness (existence of a finite carrier) and computability,
which is the focus of this paper. The results of the investigation (of all the
24 × 22 = 64 classes) are summarized in Table 1 in Section 3.3
To present what we can observe from Table 1, we define what we mean
by an axiom (namely computability) being independent of others (namely
the four conventional axioms): We say that “computability is independent
of the four axioms (within a class of games)” if for each of the sixteen types,
there is a computable game of that type (in that class) if and only if there
is a noncomputable game of that type (in that class).4 Put differently, if
computability is not independent of the four axioms within a certain class,
then for some type t, there are type t games in the class, but they are all
computable or all noncomputable.
One of our main findings is (Proposition 1) that computability is inde-
pendent of the four conventional axioms within the class of infinite games.
(The analogue of Proposition 1 does not hold for the class of finite games.
This is because all finite games are computable.) In fact, we come close
1Despite Arrow’s endorsement (Arrow, 1963, footnote 27, page 102), complete inves-
tigations of a set of axioms are rare in the literature, such as social choice, that adopts
the axiomatic method. It is common to say that an axiom (called A1) is “independent”
of some other axioms if there are (i) a rule satisfying A1 and the others and (ii) a rule
violating A1 but satisfying the others (Thomson, 2001, Section 4.1.3).
2Sometimes referred to as a “voting game” or a “simple coalitional game” in the liter-
ature.
3Kumabe and Mihara (2008b) continue the complete investigation, considering only
computable games. That paper asks which “degrees of rationality” are achievable in each
of the thirty-two classes, while the present paper asks whether each class is empty.
4This notion of independence generally requires examination of many more cases than
that in footnote 1 (which examines just two cases). Note that “complete independence”
in May’s sense of the six axioms cannot be achieved, since the four conventional axioms
are not “completely independent.” For example, it is well known that there exist no weak,
nonproper games.
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to saying that computability is independent of the four conventional axioms
(within the class of all games). The conditions for the independence are sat-
isfied for fifteen out of the sixteen types. The only exception is type 2, con-
sisting exclusively of dictatorial (hence computable) games. This strongly
suggests that computability is logically, as well as conceptually, unrelated to
the conventional axioms.5 In other words, as far as compatibility with the
conventional axioms are concerned, computability is almost nonrestrictive.
The rest of the Introduction gives a brief background. The companion
paper (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008a) gives further discussion.
One can think of simple games as representing voting methods or multi-
criterion decision rules. They have been central to the study of social choice
(e.g., Peleg, 2002; Kumabe and Mihara, 2010). For this reason, the paper
can be viewed as a contribution to the foundations of computability analy-
sis of social choice, which studies algorithmic properties of social decision-
making.6
The importance of computability in social choice theory would be unar-
guable. First, the use of the language by social choice theorists suggests the
importance: for example, Arrow (1963) uses words such as “process or rule”
or “procedure.” Second, there is a normative reason: computability of social
choice rules formalizes the notion of “due process.”
We consider an infinite set of “players.” Roughly speaking, a simple
game is computable if there is a Turing program (finite algorithm) that
can decide from any description (by integer) of each coalition whether it is
winning or losing. Since each member of a coalition should be describable,
we assume that the set N of (the names of) players is countable, say, N =
N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Each coalition is described by a Turing program that can
decide for the name of each player whether she is in the coalition. Note
that there are infinitely many Turing programs that describes the same
coalition. Since each Turing program has its code number (Go¨del number),
the coalitions describable in this manner are describable by an integer, as
desired. (Such coalitions are called recursive coalitions.)
Kumabe and Mihara (2008a) give three interpretations of countably many
players: (i) generations of people extending into the indefinite future, (ii)
finitely many persons facing countably many states of the world (Mihara,
1997), and (iii) attributes or criteria in multi-criterion decision-making.
Examples of multi-criterion decisions include (a) forming a team to per-
form a particular task (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008a),7 (b) granting tenure
5What is behind this terminology is the discussion of logical and conceptual indepen-
dence by Thomson (2001). We do not define “conceptual independence” mathematically.
6This literature includes Kelly (1988), Lewis (1988), Bartholdi et al. (1989a,b), Mihara
(1997, 1999, 2004), and Kumabe and Mihara (2008a,b).
7This example illustrates that the desirability of the (conventional) axioms depends on
the context. Monotonicity makes sense here, but may be too optimistic (adding a member
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to junior faculty members at academic institutions (Al-Najjar et al., 2006),
and (c) deciding whether a certain act is legal (Kumabe and Mihara, 2007).
In these examples, there are potentially infinitely many criteria or contin-
gencies on which decisions can be based.
2 Framework
2.1 Simple games
Let N = N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} be a countable set of (the names of) players. In-
tuitively, a simple game describes in a crude manner the power distribution
among observable (or describable) subsets of players. Such sets are called
coalitions. In this paper, we define a coalition to be a recursive (algo-
rithmically decidable) set; it is a set of players for which there is a Turing
program (algorithm) that can decide for the name of each player whether
she is in the set.8 Note that the class REC of (recursive) coalitions
forms a Boolean algebra; that is, it includes N and is closed under union,
intersection, and complementation.
Formally, a (simple) game is a collection ω ⊆ REC of (recursive) coali-
tions. We will be explicit when we require that N ∈ ω. The coalitions in ω
are said to be winning. The coalitions not in ω are said to be losing. One
can regard a simple game as a function from REC to {0, 1}, assigning the
value 1 or 0 to each coalition, depending on whether it is winning or losing.
We introduce from the theory of cooperative games a few basic notions
of simple games (Peleg, 2002; Weber, 1994). A simple game ω is said to be
monotonic if for all coalitions S and T , the conditions S ∈ ω and T ⊇ S
imply T ∈ ω. ω is proper if for all recursive coalitions S, S ∈ ω implies
Sc := N \S /∈ ω. ω is strong if for all coalitions S, S /∈ ω implies Sc ∈ ω. ω
is weak if ω = ∅ or the intersection
⋂
S∈ω S =
⋂
ω of the winning coalitions
is nonempty. The members of
⋂
S∈ω S are called veto players; they are
the players that belong to all winning coalitions. (The set
⋂
S∈ω S of veto
players may or may not be observable.) ω is dictatorial if there exists
some i0 (called a dictator) in N such that ω = {S ∈ REC : i0 ∈ S }.
Note that a dictator is a veto player, but a veto player is not necessarily a
dictator. It is immediate to prove the following well-known lemmas:
Lemma 1 If a simple game is weak, it is proper.
may turn an acceptable team into an unacceptable one). Properness may be irrelevant
or even undesirable (ensuring that a given task can be performed by two non-overlapping
teams may be important from the viewpoint of reliability). These observations suggest
the importance of finding games that violate some of the axioms.
8A set S is recursive if there is a Turing machine that halts on any input i ∈ N ,
yielding output 1 if i ∈ S and 0 otherwise. Soare (1987) and Odifreddi (1992) give
a precise definition of recursive sets as well as detailed discussion of recursion theory.
Mihara’s papers (Mihara, 1997, 1999) contain short reviews of recursion theory.
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Lemma 2 A simple game is dictatorial if and only if it is strong and weak.
A carrier of a simple game ω is a coalition S ⊆ N such that for all
coalitions T , we have T ∈ ω iff S ∩ T ∈ ω. We observe that if S is a carrier,
then so is any coalition S′ ⊇ S. Slightly abusing the word, we sometimes
say a game is finite if it has a finite carrier; otherwise, it is infinite.
2.2 The computability notion
Notation. A partial function (of n variables) is a function (into natural
numbers) whose domain is a subset of Nn. For a partial function ψ, ψ(x) ↓
means ψ(x) is defined; ψ(x) ↑ means ψ(x) is undefined. For k ∈ N, let ϕk(·)
be the kth partial recursive function (of one variable)—it is the partial func-
tion (of one variable) computed by the Turing program with code (Go¨del)
number k. ‖
First, we represent each recursive coalition by a characteristic index (∆0-
index). A number e is a characteristic index for a coalition S if ϕe is
the characteristic function for S.9 Intuitively, a characteristic index for a
coalition describes the coalition by a Turing program that can decide its
membership.
Next, we introduce an indicator for a game. It assigns the value 1 or 0 to
each number representing a coalition, depending on whether the coalition is
winning or losing. When a number does not represent a recursive coalition,
the value is undefined. Given a simple game ω, its δ-indicator is the partial
function δω on N defined by
δω(e) =


1 if e is a characteristic index for a recursive set in ω,
0 if e is a characteristic index for a recursive set not in ω,
↑ if e is not a characteristic index for any recursive set.
Note that δω is well-defined since each e ∈ N can be a characteristic index for
at most one set. If e and e′ are characteristic indices for the same coalition,
then the definition implies δω(e) = δω(e
′).
Finally, we introduce the notion of (δ)-computable games. The condition
requires existence of a Turing program that correctly answers whether a
coalition is winning or losing, from any one of infinitely many characteristic
indices for the coalition.
Definition 1 A game ω is (δ)-computable if δω has an extension to a
partial recursive function.10
9The characteristic function for S takes the value 1 if the input belongs to S; it takes
0 otherwise. The same coalition has infinitely many characteristic indices.
10A partial function δ′ is an extension of δω if whenever δω(e) ↓, we have δ
′(e) = δω(e).
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Among various notions of computability that we could conceive of, this
notion is the only one that we find (Mihara, 2004) defensible.11
3 Overview of the Results
This section gives a summary of the results in Sections 5–6.
We classify games into sixty-four (24 × 22) classes as shown in Table 1,
in terms of their (conventional) types (with respect to the conventional
axioms of monotonicity, properness, strongness, and nonweakness), finite-
ness (existence of a finite carrier), and δ-computability. For each of the 64
classes, we ask whether there exists a game in the class. The answers are
given in Sections 5–6.12 Table 1 summarizes the answers.13
We are mainly interested in the relation of computability to the four
conventional axioms. What can we observe from Table 1? For example,
we can see that there is a computable game of type 2 (+ + +−), but not a
noncomputable game of the same type. (In fact, type 2 consists of dictatorial
games.) This means that computability is not “independent of” the four
axioms in the following sense: there is a nonempty type consisting only of
computable games or only of noncomputable games.
For each of the other fifteen types, however, there is a computable game
of that type if and only if there is a noncomputable game of that type. Hence,
we could almost say that computability is “unrelated to” the four axioms.
In fact, if we restrict our attention to the infinite games (games without a
finite carrier), we can say this:
Proposition 1 The axiom δ-computability is independent of monotonicity,
properness, strongness, and nonweakness within the class of infinite games in
the following sense: for each of the 24 = 16 types, there exists a computable
infinite game of that type if and only if there exists a noncomputable infinite
game of that type.
We leave this section with two interesting observations involving the last
three (instead of two as in Proposition 1) columns of the table: From the
rows corresponding to types 6, 8, 10, 14, 16, we conclude that if there does
not exist a finite computable game of a particular type, then there does not
11As long as games are defined for (recursive) coalitions, this notion of computability
is equivalent to the following (Kumabe and Mihara, 2007, Corollary 1): there exists a
Turing machine that, given any coalition S encoded as an infinite binary sequence (ith
term indicating whether i ∈ S), halts and correctly decides whether S is winning.
12 Among the sixteen types, five (types 6, 8, 10, 14, and 16) contain no games; also, the
class of type 2 infinite games is empty (since type 2 games are dictatorial). These results
are immediate from Lemmas 1 and 2.
13Some of the games constructed in this paper have the property that an empty coalition
is winning. However, one can modify all such computable games so that an empty coalition
is losing (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008b).
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Table 1: Existence of Games in Different Classes
Finite Infinite
Types Non Computable Non Computable
1 (+ + ++) no yes yes yes
2 (+ + +−) no yes no no
3 (+ +−+) no yes yes yes
4 (+ +−−) no yes yes yes
5 (+−++) no yes yes yes
6 (+−+−) no no no no
7 (+−−+) no yes yes yes
8 (+−−−) no no no no
9 (−+++) no yes yes yes
10 (−++−) no no no no
11 (−+−+) no yes yes yes
12 (−+−−) no yes yes yes
13 (−−++) no yes yes yes
14 (−−+−) no no no no
15 (−−−+) no yes yes yes
16 (−−−−) no no no no
The types are defined by the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, proper-
ness, strongness, and nonweakness. For example, the entries corresponding
to type 2 (+ + +−) indicates that among the monotonic (+), proper (+),
strong (+), weak (−, because not nonweak) games, there exist no finite non-
computable ones, there exist finite computable ones, there exist no infinite
noncomputable ones, and there exist no infinite computable ones. Note that
except for type 2, the last three columns are identical.
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exist a game of that type. From the other rows except row 2, we conclude
that if there exists an infinite (non)computable game of a particular type,
then there exists a finite computable game of that type.
4 Preliminary Results
This section gives a sufficient condition and a necessary condition for a game
to be computable. It also introduces notation needed in Sections 5–6.
Notation. We identify a natural number k with the finite set {0, 1, 2, . . . , k−
1}, which is an initial segment of N. Given a coalition S ⊆ N , we write
S ∩ k to represent the coalition {i ∈ S : i < k} consisting of the members
of S whose name is less than k. We call S ∩ k the k-initial segment of
S, and view it either as a subset of N or as the string S[k] of length k
of 0’s and 1’s (representing the restriction of its characteristic function to
{0, 1, 2, . . . , k − 1}). ‖
Definition 2 Consider a simple game. A string τ (of 0’s and 1’s) of length k ≥
0 is winning determining if any coalition G ∈ REC extending τ (in the
sense that τ is an initial segment of G, i.e., G∩k = τ) is winning; τ is losing
determining if any coalition G ∈ REC extending τ is losing. A string is
determining if it is either winning determining or losing determining.
First, to construct computable games, we use the following proposition,
which simply restates the “if” direction of Theorem 4 in Kumabe and Mihara
(2008a). In particular, finite games are computable. As seen in Section 3,
whether a game is finite is an important criterion for classifying games in
this paper.
Proposition 2 Let T0 and T1 be recursively enumerable sets of (nonempty)
strings such that any coalition has an initial segment in T0 or in T1 but not
both. Let ω be the simple game defined by S ∈ ω if and only if S has an
initial segment in T1. Then T1 consists only of winning determining strings,
T0 consists only of losing determining strings (so S /∈ ω if and only if S has
an initial segment in T0), and ω is δ-computable.
Second, to construct noncomputable games, we use the following propo-
sition (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008a, Proposition 3). Here, the number k− 1
may be greater than the greatest element, if any, of S:
Proposition 3 Suppose that a δ-computable simple game is given. (i) If a
coalition S is winning, then it has an initial segment S[k] (for some k ∈ N)
that is winning determining. (ii) If S is losing, then it has an initial segment
S[k] that is losing determining.
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Notation. Let α and β be strings (of 0’s and 1’s). Then αc denotes the
string of the length |α| such that αc(i) = 1 − α(i) for each i < |α|; for
example, 0110100100c = 1001011011. Occasionally, a string α is identified
with the set {i : α(i) = 1}. (Note however that αc is occasionally identified
with the set {i : α(i) = 0}, but never with the set {i : α(i) = 1}c.) αβ (or
α ∗ β) denotes the concatenation of α followed by β. α[k] denotes the prefix
(initial segment) of α of length k. α ⊆ β means that α is a prefix of β (β
extends α); α ⊆ A, where A is a set, means that α is an initial segment of A
(i.e, α is equal to the initial segment A[k], for some k.) Strings α and β are
incompatible if neither α ⊆ β nor β ⊆ α (i.e., there is k < min{|α|, |β|}
such that α(k) 6= β(k)). ‖
5 Finite Games
We start with the class of finite games (games having a finite carrier). Any
game in this class is δ-computable.
In the following, for each of the eleven conventional types (with respect
to monotonicity, properness, strongness, and nonweakness) not shown to be
empty so far (footnote 12), we give an example of a finite game of that type
by exhibiting finite sets T0 and T1 satisfying the condition of Proposition 2.
1 (+ + ++) A monotonic, proper, strong, nonweak game. Let T0 =
{00, 010, 100} and T1 = {11, 011, 101}.
2 (+++−) A monotonic, proper, strong, weak game. Let T0 = {0} and
T1 = {1}. Player 0 is a dictator.
3 (+ +−+) A monotonic, proper, nonstrong, nonweak game. Let T0 =
{00, 010, 0110, 100, 1010} and T1 = {11, 1011, 0111}.
4 (+ + −−) A monotonic, proper, nonstrong, weak game. Let T0 =
{0, 10} and T1 = {11}.
5 (+ −++) A monotonic, nonproper, strong, nonweak game. Let T0 =
{00} and T1 = {1, 01}.
7 (+ − −+) A monotonic, nonproper, nonstrong, nonweak game. Let
T0 = {00, 100, 0110, 0100} and T1 = {11, 101, 0101, 0111}.
9 (− +++) A nonmonotonic, proper, strong, nonweak game. Let T0 =
{1} and T1 = {0}.
11 (− + −+) A nonmonotonic, proper, nonstrong, nonweak game. Let
T0 = {1, 01} and T1 = {00}.
12 (− +−−) A nonmonotonic, proper, nonstrong, weak game. Let T0 =
{1, 00} and T1 = {01}.
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13 (− − ++) A nonmonotonic, nonproper, strong, nonweak game. Let
T0 = {10} and T1 = {0, 11}.
15 (−−−+) A nonmonotonic, nonproper, nonstrong, nonweak game. Let
T0 = {01, 10} and T1 = {00, 11}.
6 Infinite Games
We consider infinite games (games without finite carriers) in this section.
6.1 Noncomputable games
We first give examples of infinite noncomputable simple games. Proposi-
tion 3 implies that all computable games (that have both winning and losing
coalitions) belong to the class of games that have both finite winning coali-
tions and cofinite losing coalitions. To show that variety is not lost even
if we restrict our games to this class, all the examples are chosen from the
class. The examples in this section are based on the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Let A be a recursive set. Let T0 and T1 be recursively enumerable,
nonempty sets of (nonempty) strings such that any coalition has an initial
segment in T0 or in T1 but not both. Let ω be the simple game defined by
S ∈ ω if and only if either S = A or [S 6= Ac and S has an initial segment
in T1]. Then we have the following:
(i) S /∈ ω if and only if either S = Ac or [S 6= A and S has an initial
segment in T0].
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(ii) ω has a finite winning coalition and a cofinite losing coalition.
(iii) Suppose further that either A is infinite and has an initial segment in T0
or Ac is infinite and has an initial segment in T1. Then ω is δ-noncomputable
(hence infinite).
Proof. (i) From the definition of ω and the assumption that any coalition
S has a initial segment in T0 or T1 but not both, we have
S /∈ ω ⇐⇒ S 6= A and [S = Ac or S has no initial segment in T1]
⇐⇒ [S 6= A and S = Ac] or
[S 6= A and S has no initial segment in T1]
⇐⇒ [S = Ac] or [S 6= A and S has an initial segment in T0].
(ii) Choose a string α from the nonempty set T1. Let β = α ∗ A(|α|).
Then β 6= Ac since β(|α|) = A(|α|) 6= Ac(|α|). Since β has the prefix (initial
14Let ωˆ be the game defined by Proposition 2. It follows that (a) S ∈ ω if and only if
either S = A or [S 6= Ac and S ∈ ωˆ], (b) S /∈ ω if and only if either S = Ac or [S 6= A and
S /∈ ωˆ], (c) if ωˆ is proper, then ω is proper, (d) if ωˆ is strong, then ω is strong.
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segment) α ∈ T1, β ∈ ω by the definition of ω. We have obtained a finite
winning coalition, namely β. To obtain a cofinite losing coalition, choose
α ∈ T0 and let β = α ∗A
c(|α|). Then by (i), B := {i : β(i) = 1 or β(i) ↑} is
a cofinite losing set.
(iii) Suppose A is infinite and has an initial segment A[k] in T0. Suppose
ω is δ-computable. Then, by Proposition 3, the winning coalition A has
an initial segment A[k′] that is a winning determining string. Let kˆ =
max{k, k′}. Then on the one hand, A[kˆ], which is different from A and has
an initial segment in T0, is losing by (i). On the other hand, A[kˆ] is winning
since it extends the winning determining string A[k′]. We have obtained a
contradiction. The case where Ac is infinite and has an initial segment in T1
is similar.
For each conventional type t not shown to be empty so far (there are
ten such types; footnote 12), we can construct an example of an infinite
noncomputable game ωt of that type as follows: Let T0 and T1 be those sets
in the example for type t in Section 5. Let A be the infinite set represented
by τ ∗ 1111 . . . (i.e., i /∈ A iff i < |τ | and τ(i) = 0), where τ is any string
belonging to T0. (For t = 7, we also require τ 6= 0100.) For t 6= 5, let ω
t be
the game ω defined by Lemma 3. For t = 5, define ω5 by S ∈ ω5 if and only
if S = A or S has an initial segment in T1 (thus S /∈ ω
5 if and only if S 6= A
and S has an initial segment in T0). It is routine to verify, for each t, that
ωt is indeed of type t.15
6.2 A class of infinite, computable, type 1 games
In this section, we construct for each recursive set A, an infinite, computable,
monotonic, proper, strong, nonweak simple game ω[A]. The construction is
self-contained, but long and elaborate. One reason that the construction is
complicated is that we construct a family of type 1 games ω[A], one for each
recursive set A, while requiring additional conditions that would become
useful for constructing other types of games in Section 6.3.16
Our approach is to construct recursively enumerable sets T0 and T1 of
strings (of 0’s and 1’s) satisfying the conditions of Proposition 2. We first
construct certain sets Fs of strings for s ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. We then specify an
algorithm for enumerating the elements of T0 and T1 using the sets Fs, and
construct a simple game ω[A] according to Proposition 2. We conclude that
the game is computable by checking (Lemma 10) that T0 and T1 satisfy the
15Kumabe and Mihara (2007) give more detailed proofs for a different set of examples.
16In Kumabe and Mihara (2008b, Appendix A), we construct just one type 1 game,
without requiring the additional conditions. Some aspects of the construction thus become
more apparent in that construction. The construction there extends the one (not requiring
the game to be of a particular type) in the companion paper (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008a,
Section 6.2). The reader might want to consult these papers first.
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conditions of Proposition 2. Finally, we show (Lemmas 12, 13, and 14) that
the game satisfies the desired properties.
Before constructing sets T0 and T1 of determining strings, we introduce
the notions of p-strings and d-strings. Roughly speaking, a p-string consists
of 10’s or 01’s; A d-string is a concatenation of a p-string followed by 00 or 11.
More formally, a string α is a p-string if |α| is even and for each 2k < |α|,
we have α(2k)α(2k+1) ∈ {10, 01} (i.e., α(2k+1) = 1−α(2k)). Examples of
a p-string include the empty string, 01, 0101, 0110, and 1001011010. Note
that any prefix (initial substring) of even length of a p-string is a p-string.
Denote by α− the prefix α[|α| − 1] of α of length |α| − 1. In other words,
α = α− ∗ α(|α| − 1). A string α (of even length) is a d-string if α−− is a
p-string and α(|α| − 2)α(|α| − 1) ∈ {00, 11} (i.e., α(|α| − 2) = α(|α| − 1)).
In other words, a d-string α is of the form α−− ∗ 00 or α−− ∗ 11 for some
p-string α−−. It is easy to prove (Kumabe and Mihara, 2007) the following
lemma:
Lemma 4 (i) Any string of even length either is a p-string or extends a
d-string. (ii) Any two distinct d-strings α and β are incompatible. That is,
we have neither α ⊆ β nor β ⊆ α (i.e., there is k < min{|α|, |β|} such that
α(k) 6= β(k)).
Let {ks}
∞
s=0 be an effective listing (recursive enumeration) of the mem-
bers of the recursively enumerable set {k : ϕk(2k) ∈ {0, 1}}, where ϕk(·)
is the kth partial recursive function of one variable (which is computed by
the Turing program with code number k). We can assume without loss of
generality that k0 ≥ 1 and all the elements ks are distinct. Thus,
CRec ⊂ {k : ϕk(2k) ∈ {0, 1}} = {k0, k1, k2, . . .},
where CRec is the set of characteristic indices for recursive sets.
Let l0 = 2k0+2 ≥ 4 and for s > 0, let ls = max{ls−1, 2ks+2}. Then {ls}
is an nondecreasing sequence of even numbers and ls > 2ks + 1 for each s.
Note also that ls ≥ ls−1 > 2ks−1 + 1, ls ≥ ls−2 > 2ks−2 + 1, etc. imply that
ls > 2ks + 1, 2ks−1 + 1, 2ks−2 + 1, . . . , 2k0 + 1.
For each s, let Fs be the finite set of p-strings α = α(0)α(1) · · · α(ls−1) ⊇
10 of length ls ≥ 4 such that
(1) α(2ks) = ϕks(2ks) and for each s
′ < s, α(2ks′) = 1− ϕk
s′
(2ks′).
Note that (1) imposes no constraints on α(2k) for k /∈ {k0, k1, k2, . . . , ks},
while it actually imposes constraints for all k in the set, since |α| = ls > 2ks,
2ks−1, 2ks−2, . . . , 2k0. We observe that if α ∈ Fs ∩ Fs′ , then s = s
′. Let
F =
⋃
s
Fs. Then F is recursive and we have the following:
Lemma 5 Any two distinct elements in F are incompatible.
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Proof. Let α, β ∈ F such that |α| ≤ |β|, without loss of generality. If
α and β have the same length, then the conclusion follows since otherwise
they become identical strings. If ls = |α| < |β| = ls′ , then s < s
′ and by (1),
α(2ks) = ϕks(2ks) on the one hand, but β(2ks) = 1− ϕks(2ks) on the other
hand. So α(2ks) 6= β(2ks).
Let f be a recursive bijection from F onto N (f can be obtained by
enumerating the elements of F one by one, assigning 0 to the first element
enumerated, 1 to the second element enumerated, and so on). Regarding
f as a partial function on the set of strings, we have f(α) ↓ (i.e., f(α) is
defined) if and only if α ∈ F .
Lemma 6 Let α ⊇ 10 be a p-string of length ls. Then the following state-
ments are equivalent: (i) no prefix of α is in F ; (ii) for each s′ ≤ s,
α[ls′ ] /∈ F ; (iii) for each s
′ ≤ s, f(α[ls′ ]) ↑; (iv) for each s
′ ≤ s, α(2ks′) =
1− ϕk
s′
(2ks′).
Proof. The definition of F implies that α ∈ F only if |α| = ls for some s.
Hence the equivalence of (i), (ii), and (iii) is immediate. We next show that
(ii) and (iv) are equivalent. The direction from (iv) to (ii) is clear from (1).
To see the other direction, suppose that (iv) is not the case; we derive the
negation of (ii). For some s′ ≤ s, we have α(2ks′) = ϕk
s′
(2ks′). Choose the
least such s′. Then (s′ = 0 or) for any s′′ < s′, α(2ks′′) = 1−ϕk
s′′
(2ks′′). So
α[ls′ ] ∈ Fs′ by (1), since α[ls′ ] ⊇ 10 is a p-string of length ls′ . Thus (ii) is
violated.
Let A be a recursive set. The game ω[A] will be defined via the sets
T0 := T
A
0 and T1 := T
A
1 of strings, constructed by enumerating the elements
as follows:
Construction of T0 and T1. For each s and α ∈ Fs (having a length ls
and extending 10),
(2.i) for each p-string α′ that is a proper prefix of α, if s = 0 or |α′| ≥ ls−1,
then enumerate α′ ∗ 11 in T1 and α
′ ∗ 00 in T0;
(2.ii) if f(α) ∈ A, enumerate α in T1; if f(α) /∈ A, enumerate α in T0 (note
that f(α) ↓ since α ∈ F );
(3) if a string β is enumerated in T1 (or in T0) above, then enumerate β
c
in T0 (or in T1, respectively).
Clearly, T0 and T1 are recursively enumerable because of this generating
algorithm. We observe that the sets T0 and T1 consist of
• d-strings (11, 00, and those extending 10 enumerated at (2.i) and those
extending 01 enumerated at (3) via (2.i)) and
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• p-strings (those extending 10 enumerated at (2.ii) and those extending
01 enumerated at (3) via (2.ii)).
We also observe that 11 ∈ T1, 00 ∈ T0, T0 ∩ T1 = ∅, and α ∈ T0 ⇔ α
c ∈ T1.
Define a game ω[A] by S ∈ ω[A] if and only if S has an initial segment
in T1. Lemma 10 establishes computability of ω[A] (as well as the assertion
that T0 consists of losing determining strings and T1 consists of winning
determining strings) by way of Proposition 2.
Lemma 7 Let α, β be distinct strings in T0∪T1. Then α and β are incom-
patible. In particular, if α ∈ T0 and β ∈ T1, then α and β are incompatible.
Proof. Obviously, neither α nor β is an empty string. Since T0 and T1
consist of p-strings and d-strings, there are three cases to consider:
Case (pp): Both α and β are p-strings. Then either α or αc is enumer-
ated at (2.ii) of the generating algorithm and so α ∈ F or αc ∈ F . Similarly,
β ∈ F or βc ∈ F . If α ∈ F and β ∈ F , then α and β are incompatible, since
any two distinct elements of F are incompatible by Lemma 5. If α ∈ F and
βc ∈ F , then α ⊃ 10 and β ⊃ 01, so they are incompatible. The other two
subcases are similar.
Case (pd): one of α or β is a p-string and the other is a d-string.
Without a loss of generality, α is a p-string and β is a d-string. Suppose
α and β are compatible. Then, β ⊃ α. In fact, β−− ⊇ α. As in (pp)
above, either α ∈ F or αc ∈ F . Also, since either β or βc is enumerated
at (2.i) of the algorithm, we have either (pd.i) β−− ⊂ β˜ for some β˜ ∈ F or
(pd.ii) (βc)−− ⊂ βˆ for some βˆ ∈ F . Subcase: α ∈ F and (pd.i). α and β˜
and both in F . So they are incompatible by Lemma 5, contradicting the
fact that α ⊆ β−− ⊂ β˜. Subcase: α ∈ F and (pd.ii). Then α ⊇ 10 but
β ⊃ 01, a contradiction. Subcase: αc ∈ F and (pd.i). Similar to the second
subcase. Subcase: αc ∈ F and (pd.ii). Similar to the first subcase.
Case (dd): Both α and β are d-strings. Immediate from Lemma 4.
Notation. We write f(β) ↓∈ A if f(β) ∈ A (which requires f(β) ↓); we
write f(β)↓ /∈ A if f(β) ↓ but f(β) /∈ A.
Lemma 8 Let α ⊃ 1 be a string of length ls.
(i) α extends a string in T1 if and only if (i.a) for some s
′ ≤ s, f(α[ls′ ])↓
∈ A (in this case, α[ls′ ] ∈ T1) or (i.b) α extends a d-string α
′ =
(α′)−−∗11 such that no prefix of (α′)−− is in F (in this case, α′ ∈ T1).
(ii) α extends a string in T0 if and only if (ii.a) for some s
′ ≤ s, f(α[ls′ ])↓
/∈ A (in this case, α[ls′ ] ∈ T0) or (ii.b) α extends a d-string α
′ =
(α′)−−∗00 such that no prefix of (α′)−− is in F (in this case, α′ ∈ T0).
(iii) α does not extend a string in T0 ∪T1 if and only if α is a p-string and
no prefix of α is in F .
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Proof. (i) (=⇒). Assume α ⊇ 11. Then (i.b) is satisfied by letting
α′ = 11.
Assume α ⊇ 10 extends a string α′ ∈ T1. Suppose first that α
′ is
enumerated in T1 by applying (2.i) of the generating algorithm. (We show
(i.b) holds.) Then α′ = (α′)−−∗11 and (α′)−− is properly extended by some
element in Fs. Since any two different elements in F are incompatible by
Lemma 5, no prefix of (α′)−− is in F . So (i.b) holds. Suppose next that α′
is enumerated in T1 by applying (2.ii). Then f(α
′) ∈ A. Since α′ = α[ls′ ] for
some s′ ≤ s, we obtain (i.a). Finally, the case where α′ ⊇ 10 is enumerated
in T1 by applying (3) is impossible, since every string enumerated at (3)
extends 0.
(⇐=). Assume α ⊇ 11. Since 11 ∈ T1, the left hand side of (i) holds.
Assume α ⊇ 10 and either (i.a) or (i.b) holds.
Suppose (i.a) first. By the definition of f , α[ls′ ] ∈ Fs′ . Since f(α[ls′ ]) ∈
A, we have α[ls′ ] ∈ T1 by (2.ii). So α extends a string in T1.
Suppose (i.b) next: α extends a d-string α′ = (α′)−− ∗ 11 such that no
prefix of (α′)−− is in F . We show that α′ is in T1.
Suppose (α′)−− ⊂ α[l0] first. Since l0 is even and (α
′)−− is a p-string
of even length < l0, we have |(α
′)−−| ≤ l0 − 2. Since l0 := 2k0 + 2, we
can find a p-string β of length l0 that is an extension of (α
′)−− such that
β(2k0) = ϕk0(2k0). Then β ∈ F0 and by (2.i) (for β and (α
′)−− instead of
α and α′, respectively), α′ = (α′)−− ∗ 11 ∈ T1.
Otherwise, there is s′′ such that 0 < s′′ ≤ s and α[ls′′−1] ⊆ (α
′)−− ⊂
α[ls′′ ]. Since α
′ is a d-string, (α′)−− is a p-string. As α[ls′′−1] ⊆ (α
′)−− and
no prefix of (α′)−− is in F , α[ls′′−1] is a p-string of which no prefix is in F .
By Lemma 6, for each t ≤ s′′ − 1, we have α[ls′′−1](2kt) = 1− ϕkt(2kt).
Since α[ls′′−1] ⊆ (α
′)−− ⊂ α[ls′′ ], we have ls′′−1 < ls′′ . Hence ls′′ :=
max{ls′′−1, 2ks′′ +2} = 2ks′′ +2. Since |(α
′)−−| and ls′′ are even, |(α
′)−−| ≤
2ks′′ . We can find a p-string β of length ls′′ that is an extension of (α
′)−−
such that β(2ks′′) = ϕk
s′′
(2ks′′). Therefore, for each t ≤ s
′′ − 1, we have
β[ls′′−1](2kt) = (α
′)−−[ls′′−1](2kt) = 1 − ϕkt(2kt). So β ∈ Fs′′ by (1). Then
since |(α′)−−| ≥ ls′′−1, we have by (2.i) (for β and (α
′)−− instead of α and
α′, respectively), α′ = (α′)−− ∗ 11 ∈ T1.
(ii) Similar to (i).
(iii) (=⇒). Suppose that α does not extend a string in T0∪T1. Then the
negations of (i.a) and of (ii.a) imply for each t ≤ s, f(α[lt]) ↑, which implies
by Lemma 6 that no prefix of α is in F . Furthermore, (since no prefix of α
is in F ) the negations of (i.b) and of (ii.b) imply that α does not extend a
d-string. By Lemma 4 (i), α is a p-string.
(⇐=). Suppose that α is a p-string and no prefix of α is in F . Since α is
a p-string, no prefix of α is a d-string. So α does not satisfy (i.b) or (ii.b).
Since no prefix α′ of α is in F , we have for such α′, f(α′) ↑. So α does not
satisfy (i.a) or (ii.a). Therefore, α does not extend a string in T0 ∪ T1.
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Lemma 9 Let α ⊃ 1 be a string of length ls such that α(2ks) = ϕks(2ks).
Then α extends a string in T0 ∪ T1.
Proof. If α ⊇ 11, the conclusion follows immediately, since 11 ∈ T1.
Suppose α ⊇ 10. We prove the lemma by induction on s. Assume s = 0.
If α is a p-string, then α ∈ F0. By (2.ii) of the generating algorithm for T0
and T1, we obtain α ∈ T0 ∪ T1. Otherwise, by Lemma 4 (i), α extends a
d-string β. Since |β−−| < l0 ≤ ls for all s, no prefix of β
−− is in F (because
F consists of certain strings of length ls for some s). By Lemma 8 (i.b) or
(ii.b), α extends a string (namely β) in T0 ∪ T1.
Assume the lemma holds for s−1. If for some s′ < s, α(2ks′) = ϕk
s′
(2ks′)
then by the induction hypothesis, α[ls′ ] extends a string in T0 ∪ T1. So α
extends a string in T0 ∪ T1. Otherwise, for each s
′ < s, α(2ks′) = 1 −
ϕk
s′
(2ks′). If α is a p-string then α ∈ F by (1), hence it is in T0 ∪ T1 by
(2.ii) of the construction. If α is not a p-string then by Lemma 4 (i), α
extends a d-string β. Then |β−−| < ls. Since β ⊆ α and for each s
′ < s,
α(2ks′) = 1− ϕk
s′
(2ks′), no prefix of β
−− is in F by (1). By Lemma 8 (i.b)
or (ii.b), α extends a string (namely β) in T0 ∪ T1.
Lemma 10 Any coalition S ∈ REC has an initial segment in T0 or in T1,
but not both.
Proof. We show that S has an initial segment in T0 ∪ T1. Lemma 7
implies that S does not have initial segments in both T0 and T1. (We can
actually show that S has exactly one initial segment in T0 ∪ T1, a fact used
to construct a type 4 game in Section 6.3.)
If S ⊇ 1, suppose ϕk is the characteristic function for S. Then k ∈
{k0, k1, k2, . . .} since this set contains the set CRec of characteristic indices.
So k = ks for some s. By Lemma 9, the initial segment S[ls] (i.e., ϕks [ls])
extends a string in T0 ∪ T1. So, S has an initial segment in T0 ∪ T1.
If S ⊇ 0, then Sc ⊇ 1 has an initial segment in T0 ∪ T1 by the argument
above. So, S has an initial segment in T1 ∪ T0.
Next, we show that the game ω[A] has the desired properties. Before
showing monotonicity, we need the following lemma. For strings α and β
with |α| ≤ |β|, we say β properly contains α if for each k < |α|, α(k) ≤ β(k)
and for some k′ < |α|, α(k′) < β(k′); we say β is properly contained by α if
for each k < |α|, β(k) ≤ α(k) and for some k′ < |α|, β(k′) < α(k′).
Lemma 11 Let α and β be strings such that ls = |α| ≤ |β| for some s.
(i) If α extends a string in T1 and β properly contains α, then β extends
a string in T1. (ii) If α extends a string in T0 and β is properly contained
by α, then β extends a string in T0.
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Proof. We only prove (i). The proof for (ii) is similar. Suppose that α
extends a string in T1 and that β properly contains α.
Case 1: α ⊇ 1. In this case, (i.a) or (i.b) of Lemma 8 holds.
First assume (i.a) is the case: we can choose an s′ ≤ s such that
f(α[ls′ ]) ↓∈ A (in this case, α[ls′ ] ∈ T1). If β extends α[ls′ ], clearly the
conclusion holds. Otherwise, since |β| ≥ ls ≥ ls′ , α[ls′ ] and β are incompati-
ble; that is, there exists k < ls′ such that α[ls′ ](k) 6= β(k). Choose the least
such k; since β properly contains α, we have α[ls′ ](k) = 0 and β(k) = 1. Let
β′ = β[k](= α[k]). Note that f(α[ls′ ]) ↓ implies α[ls′ ] ∈ F , which in turn
implies α[ls′ ] is a p-string.
Suppose k is even. We will show that β extends β′ ∗ 11 ∈ T1. Since
k < ls′ and ls′ is also even, we have k + 1 < ls′ , so that α[ls′ ](k + 1) ↓.
Since α[ls′ ] is a p-string, β(k + 1) ≥ α[ls′ ](k + 1) = 1 − α[ls′ ](k) = 1. So
β(k)β(k + 1) = 11. Hence β′ ∗ 11 ⊆ β[ls]. Since α[ls′ ] ∈ F , no proper prefix
of α[ls′ ] is in F . As β
′ ⊂ α[ls′ ], no prefix of β
′ is in F . So by Lemma 8 (i.b),
β[ls] extends a string (namely, β
′ ∗ 11) in T1.
Suppose k is odd. We will show that β extends (β′)− ∗ 11 ∈ T1. Since
α[ls′ ] is a p-string, β(k − 1) = α[ls′ ](k − 1) = 1 − α[ls′ ](k) = 1. So β(k −
1)β(k) = 11. Hence (β′)− ∗ 11 ⊆ β[ls]. Since no proper prefix of α[ls′ ] is
in F and (β′)− ⊂ α[ls′ ], no prefix of (β
′)− is in F . So by Lemma 8 (i.b),
β[ls] extends a string (namely, (β
′)− ∗ 11) in T1.
Next assume (i.b) is the case: α extends a d-string α′ = (α′)−− ∗ 11
such that no prefix of (α′)−− is in F (in this case, α′ ∈ T1). Choose the
least k ≤ |α| such that α(k) 6= β(k); we have α(k) = 0 and β(k) = 1. Let
β′ = β[k](= α[k]). Since α′(|α′| − 2) = α′(|α′| − 1) = 1, either k > |α′| − 1
or k < |α′| − 2 = |(α′)−−|. If k > |α′| − 1, we get β′ ⊇ α′. This implies
β ⊇ β′ ⊇ α′ ∈ T1; hence β extends a string in T1. Otherwise, we have
k < l := |(α′)−−| and β′ ⊂ (α′)−−.
Suppose k is even. Since k < l and l is also even, we have k + 1 < l,
so that (α′)−−(k + 1) ↓. Since α is a p-string, β(k + 1) ≥ (α′)−−(k + 1) =
1 − (α′)−−(k) = 1. So β(k)β(k + 1) = 11. Hence β′ ∗ 11 ⊆ β[ls]. Since
no prefix of (α′)−− is in F and β′ ⊂ (α′)−−, no prefix of β′ is in F . So by
Lemma 8 (i.b), β[ls] extends a string (namely, β
′ ∗ 11) in T1.
Suppose k is odd. Since (α′)−− is a p-string, β(k−1) = (α′)−−(k−1) =
1 − (α′)−−(k) = 1. So β(k − 1)β(k) = 11. Hence (β′)− ∗ 11 ≤ β[ls]. Since
no prefix of (α′)−− is in F and (β′)− ⊂ (α′)−−, no prefix of (β′)− is in F .
So by Lemma 8 (i.b), β[ls] extends a string (namely, (β
′)− ∗ 11) in T1.
Case 2: α ⊇ 0. First note that assertion (ii) for Case 1 can be proved
by an argument similar to the proof of assertion (i) for Case 1 above (use
Lemma 8 (ii) instead of Lemma 8 (i)). By the construction of T1 and T0,
αc ⊇ 1 extends a string in T0 and β
c is properly contained by αc. Applying
assertion (ii) for Case 1, we obtain that βc extends a string in T0. Hence β
extends a string in T1.
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Note that the preceding proof shows that β actually extends a d-string
unless it extends α[ls′ ].
Lemma 12 The game ω[A] is monotonic.
Proof. Suppose B ∈ ω[A] and B′ ⊇ B. By the definition of ω[A], B has
an initial segment α ∈ T1. Choose the least s such that ls ≥ |α|. Then the
initial segment B[ls] extends α ∈ T1. Let β = B
′[ls]. Then either β = B[ls]
or β properly contains B[ls].
If β = B[ls], then clearly β extends α ∈ T1 and so does B
′. Therefore,
B′ ∈ ω[A]. Otherwise, β properly contains B[ls], which extends α ∈ T1.
By Lemma 11 (i), β extends a string in T1 and so does B
′. Therefore,
B′ ∈ ω[A].
Lemma 13 The game ω[A] is proper and strong.
Proof. It suffices to show that Sc ∈ ω ⇔ S /∈ ω. From the observations
that T0 and T1 consist of determining strings and that α
c ∈ T0 ⇔ α ∈ T1, we
have: Sc ∈ ω iff Sc has an initial segment in T1 iff S has an initial segment
in T0 iff S /∈ ω.
Lemma 14 The game ω[A] is nonweak and does not have a finite carrier.
Proof. We construct a set B such that for infinitely many l, the l-initial
segment B[l] has an extension that is winning and an extension that is losing.
Let B ⊇ 10 be a set such that for each ks, B(2ks) = 1 − ϕks(2ks) and any
initial segment of B of even length is a p-string. Let s be such that ls+1 > ls.
Then ls+1 := max{ls, 2ks+1 + 2} = 2ks+1 + 2 and 2ks+1 + 2 > ls implies
(since both sides are even numbers) that 2ks+1 ≥ ls. By the definition of
B, for each t ≤ s, we have B(2kt) = 1 − ϕkt(2kt) and 2kt < ls (the last
inequality from the observation that ls > 2ks + 1, 2ks−1 + 1, 2ks−2 + 1, . . . ,
2k0 − 1). Then since 2ks+1 ≥ ls, there is a p-string α ⊇ B[ls] of length ls+1
such that α(2ks+1) = ϕks+1(2ks+1) and for each t ≤ s, α(2kt) = 1−ϕkt(2kt).
Then by (1), α ∈ Fs+1 and |α
−−| = |α| − 2 = ls+1 − 2 = 2ks+1 ≥ ls. So by
(2.i) of the generating algorithm, α−− ∗ 11 ∈ T1 and α
−− ∗ 00 ∈ T0.
There are infinitely many such s. It follows that any initial segment of
B has an extension in T1 and an extension in T0. This means that the game
has no finite carrier.
To show nonweakness, we give three (winning) coalitions in T1 whose
intersection is empty. First, 10 (in fact any initial segment of the coalition
B ⊇ 10) has extensions α in T1 and β in T0 by the argument above. So 01
has the extension βc in T1. Clearly, the intersection of the winning coalitions
11 ∈ T1, α ⊇ 10, and β
c ⊇ 01 is empty.
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Note that the proof that ω[A] has no finite carrier depends on (2.i), but
not (2.ii) or (3), of the generating algorithm.
6.3 Infinite computable games
In this section, for each of the ten conventional types not shown to be empty
so far (footnote 12), we give an example of an infinite computable game of
that type. Most examples are based on the game ω[A] in Section 6.2.
1 (+ + ++) A monotonic, proper, strong, nonweak game. ω[A] is such
a game.
3 (+ + −+) A monotonic, proper, nonstrong, nonweak game. Let ω =
ω[∅] ∩ ω[N]; that is, S ∈ ω if and only if S ∈ ω[∅] and S ∈ ω[N].
To show ω is proper, suppose S ∈ ω and Sc ∈ ω. Then S ∈ ω[N] and
Sc ∈ ω[N], contradicting the properness of ω[N].
To show ω is nonstrong, let α ∈ F . We show that both α and αc are
losing. On the one hand, we have α ∈ T ∅
0
by (2.ii) of the generating
algorithm. Since T ∅
0
consists of losing determining strings, α /∈ ω[∅].
Hence α /∈ ω. On the other hand, we have α ∈ TN1 by (2.ii). Hence
αc ∈ TN0 . Since T
N
0 consists of losing determining strings, α
c /∈ ω[N].
Hence αc /∈ ω, as desired.
Computability, monotonicity, and nonweakness of ω are immediate
from the corresponding properties of ω[A]. The proof that ω does not
have a finite carrier is similar to the proof for ω[A].
4 (+ + −−) A monotonic, proper, nonstrong, weak game. In the con-
struction of (the sets T0 and T1 for) ω[A] in Section 6.2, replace (2.i),
(2.ii), and (3) by
(2*.i) for each p-string α′ that is a proper prefix of α, if s = 0 or
|α′| ≥ ls−1, then enumerate 1 ∗ α
′ ∗ 11 in T1 and 1 ∗ α
′ ∗ 00 in T0;
furthermore, enumerate 0 in T0;
(2*.ii) if f(α) ∈ A, enumerate 1 ∗ α in T1; if f(α) /∈ A, enumerate 1 ∗ α
in T0;
(3*) if a string β = 1 ∗ β′ is enumerated in T1 (or in T0) above, then
enumerate 1 ∗ (β′)c in T0 (or in T1, respectively).
Let T ′0 and T
′
1 be the sets T0 and T1 in the original (Section 6.2)
construction of ω[A] renamed. We observe that β = 1 ∗ β′ ∈ Ti if and
only if β′ ∈ T ′
i
.
We first show that any coalition S has exactly one initial segment in
T0 ∪ T1. This is immediate if S ⊇ 0. So, suppose S ⊇ 1. Define S
′
by S′(k) = S(k + 1) for all k. Then, by the proof of Lemma 10 for
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ω[A], S′ has exactly one initial segment S′[k] in T ′0 ∪ T
′
1. From the
observation above, S[k+1] = 1 ∗S′[k] ∈ T0 ∪ T1 for a unique k, which
is what we wanted.
To show the game is monotonic, it suffices to show Lemma 11 (i) holds
for the newly defined game. Suppose that α, β satisfy the assumption
of the lemma and that α extends a string αˆ in T1 and β properly
contains α. Then, αˆ ⊇ 1; write αˆ = 1 ∗ αˆ′. Then αˆ′ ∈ T ′1 from the
observation above. We can write β = 1 ∗ β′. Then β′ either extends
or properly contains αˆ′ ∈ T ′1. If β
′ extends αˆ′ ∈ T ′1, then β extends
1 ∗ αˆ′ ∈ T1, as desired. Otherwise, β′ properly contains αˆ′ ∈ T ′1. By
Lemma 11 for the original game ω[A] (the condition that ls = |α| can
be ignored for our purpose), β′ extends a string βˆ ∈ T ′1. So, β = 1 ∗ β
′
extends 1 ∗ βˆ ∈ T1, as desired.
The game is weak (hence proper by Lemma 1) since every winning
coalition extends 1; in other words, 0 is a veto player. It is nonstrong
since {0} ⊇ 100 ∈ T0 implies {0} /∈ ω, while {0}
c ⊇ 0 ∈ T0 implies
{0}c /∈ ω. The proof that the game is computable and has no finite
carrier is similar to the proofs for ω[A].
5 (+ − ++) A monotonic, nonproper, strong, nonweak game. Let ω =
ω[∅] ∪ ω[N]; that is, S ∈ ω if and only if S ∈ ω[∅] or S ∈ ω[N].
To show ω is nonproper, let α ∈ F . We show that both α and αc are
winning. On the one hand, we have α ∈ TN1 by (2.ii). So α ∈ ω[N],
implying α ∈ ω. On the other hand, we have α ∈ T ∅
0
by (2.ii). Hence
αc ∈ T ∅
1
. So αc ∈ ω[∅]. Hence αc ∈ ω, as desired.
To show ω is strong, suppose S /∈ ω and Sc /∈ ω. Then S /∈ ω[N] and
Sc /∈ ω[N], contradicting the strongness of ω[N].
Computability and monotonicity of ω are immediate from the corre-
sponding properties of ω[A]. Nonweakness is immediate from non-
properness by Lemma 1. The proof that ω does not have a finite
carrier is similar to the proof for ω[A].
7 (+−−+) A monotonic, nonproper, nonstrong, nonweak game. Let A
be the set of even numbers. In the construction of ω[A], replace (2.ii)
and (3) by
(2*.ii) if f(α) ∈ A, enumerate α and αc in T1; if f(α) /∈ A, enumerate
α and αc in T0;
(3*) if a string β is enumerated in T1 (or in T0) by applying (2.i), then
enumerate βc in T0 (or in T1, respectively).
To show the game is monotonic, it suffices to show Lemma 11 (i) holds
for the newly defined game. Suppose that α, β satisfy the assumption
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of the lemma and that α extends a string α′ in T1 and β properly
contains α. Let T ′0 and T
′
1 be the sets T0 and T1 in the original con-
struction of ω[A] renamed. Note that the replacement of (2.ii) and (3)
by (2*.ii) and (3*) only affects p-strings, but not d-strings; hence the
set of d-strings in T1 is the same as the set of d-strings in T
′
1, the set
of d-strings in T0 is the same as the set of d-strings in T
′
0, and the set
of p-strings in T0 ∪ T1 is the same as the set of p-strings in T
′
0 ∪ T
′
1.
If α′ is a d-string in T1, it is in T
′
1. Lemma 11 (i) (for the original
game) implies that β extends a string in T ′1. In fact, an inspection of
the proof of Lemma 11 reveals that β extends a d-string in T ′1, unless
β ⊇ α′, in which case the conclusion is obvious. So assume β 6⊇ α′.
Then β extends a d-string in T ′1; hence it extends a d-string in T1, as
desired. If α′ is a p-string in T1, it is in T
′
1 ∪ T
′
0. If α
′ ∈ T ′1, then
Lemma 11 (i) implies that β extends a string in T ′1. So the rest of the
proof is similar. If α′ ∈ T ′0, then Lemma 11 (ii) implies that β
c extends
a string in T ′0. Assume β 6⊇ α
′ as before. Then βc extends a d-string
in T ′0; hence it extends a d-string in T0. By (3*), β extends a d-string
in T1, as desired.
The game is nonproper since (2*.ii) implies that there is a string α ∈ F
such that the coalitions {i : α(i) = 1} and {i : α(i) = 1}c (which
extends αc) are winning. Similarly, it is nonstrong since there is a
string α ∈ F such that the coalitions above are losing. It is nonweak by
Lemma 1 since it is nonproper. The proof that the game is computable
and has no finite carrier is similar to the proofs for ω[A].
9 (− + ++) A nonmonotonic, proper, strong, nonweak game. In the
construction of ω[A], replace (2.i) by
(2*.i) for each p-string α′ 6= ∅ that is a proper prefix of α, if s = 0
or |α′| ≥ ls−1, then enumerate α
′ ∗ 11 in T1 and α
′ ∗ 00 in T0;
furthermore, enumerate 00 in T1.
By (3) of the construction, 11 ∈ T0. (In other words, the game is
constructed from the sets T0 := T
′
0 ∪{11} \ {00} and T1 := T
′
1 ∪{00} \
{11}, where T ′0 and T
′
1 are T0 and T1 in the original construction of
ω[A] renamed.) Since 00 is winning and 11 is losing, the game is
nonmonotonic. It is also nonweak since 00 (or an empty coalition) is
winning. For the remaining properties, the proofs are similar to the
proofs for ω[A].
11 (−+−+) A nonmonotonic, proper, nonstrong, nonweak game. In the
construction of ω[A], replace (2.i) and (3) by
(2*.i) for each p-string α′ 6= ∅ that is a proper prefix of α, if s = 0
or |α′| ≥ ls−1, then enumerate α
′ ∗ 11 in T1 and α
′ ∗ 00 in T0;
furthermore, enumerate 00 and 11 in T0;
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(3*) if a string β /∈ {00, 11} is enumerated in T1 (or in T0) above, then
enumerate βc in T0 (or in T1, respectively).
(In other words, the game is constructed from the sets T0 := T
′
0∪{11}
and T1 := T
′
1 \ {11}, where T
′
0 and T
′
1 are T0 and T1 in the original
construction of ω[A] renamed.)
The game is nonmonotonic since N is losing but there are winning
coalitions. It is proper since it is a subset of ω[A], which is proper. It
is nonstrong since 11, 00 ∈ T0 implies that the coalitions {0, 1}, {0, 1}
c
are losing.
To show nonweakness, find a β ∈ T1 such that |β| = lt+1 for some t
(e.g., let β = α−− ∗ 11 in the proof of Lemma 14, with s replaced by
t). Choose an s such that lt+1 < ls < ls+1. Following the proof of
Lemma 14, we can find α ∈ Fs+1 such that |α
−−| ≥ ls, α
−− ∗ 11 ∈ T1,
and α−− ∗ 00 ∈ T0. Then (α
c)−− ∗ 11 ∈ T1. Nonweakness follows
since the intersection of winning coalitions β (regarded as the coalition
{i : β(i) = 1}), α−− ∗ 11 ∈ T1, and (α
c)−− ∗ 11 is empty.
The proofs of computability and nonexistence of a finite carrier are
similar to the proofs for ω[A].
12 (−+−−) A nonmonotonic, proper, nonstrong, weak game. Let A = N.
In the construction of ω[A] = ω[N], replace (2.i) by
(2*.i) for each p-string α′ that extends 1010 or 1001 and is a proper
prefix of α, if s = 0 or |α′| ≥ ls−1, then enumerate α
′ ∗ 11 in T1
and α′ ∗ 00 in T0; furthermore, enumerate d-strings 11 and 1000
in T1 and strings 1011 and 0 in T0.
and remove (3). To show that any coalition S has an initial segment
in T0 ∪ T1, suppose that S extends 1010 or 1001. (The other cases are
immediate.) Let T ′0 and T
′
1 be T0 and T1 in the original construction of
ω[N] renamed. Then, by Proposition 10, S has an initial segment S[k]
in T ′0∪T
′
1, where k ≥ 4 without loss of generality. If S[k] is enumerated
in T ′0∪T
′
1 by applying (2.ii), then it is enumerated in T0∪T1 by applying
(2.ii). So, the conclusion follows. If S[k] is enumerated in T ′0 ∪ T
′
1 by
applying (2.i), then S[k] is equal to α′∗11 or α′∗00 for some p-string α′
satisfying the requirements in (2.i). Clearly, α′ extends 1010 or 1001.
So, S[k] is enumerated in T0∪T1 by applying (2*.i). So the conclusion
follows.
To show that no coalition S has initial segments in both T0 and T1,
it suffices to show that a string α enumerated in T0 by (2*.i) and a
p-string β enumerated in T1 by (2.ii) are incompatible. (Note that all
α ∈ F are enumerated in T1 and none in T0 by (2.ii).) Since β ⊃ 10,
it is incompatible with 0 ∈ T1. All the other strings enumerated by
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(2*.i) are d-strings, so α and β are compatible only if α extends β,
which in turn extends (since β ∈ F is of length ≥ 4) 1001 or 1010.
Then, α = α′ ∗ 00 for some α′, so as above, α ∈ T ′0; similarly, β ∈ T
′
1.
This implies that α and β are incompatible.
The game ω defined above is nonmonotonic since 1000 is winning but
1011 is not. To see ω is weak (hence proper by Lemma 1), note that
any winning coalition extends 1; so the intersection contains a veto
player 0. The game is nonstrong because 0, 1011 ∈ T0 imply that the
coalitions {1} and {1}c are losing. The proofs of computability and
nonexistence of a finite carrier are similar to the proofs for ω[A].
13 (−−++) A nonmonotonic, nonproper, strong, nonweak game. In the
construction of ω[A], replace (2.i) and (3) by
(2*.i) for each p-string α′ 6= ∅ that is a proper prefix of α, if s = 0
or |α′| ≥ ls−1, then enumerate α
′ ∗ 11 in T1 and α
′ ∗ 00 in T0;
furthermore, enumerate 00 and 11 in T1;
(3*) if a string β /∈ {00, 11} is enumerated in T1 (or in T0) above, then
enumerate βc in T0 (or in T1, respectively).
(In other words, the game is constructed from the sets T0 := T
′
0 \ {00}
and T1 := T
′
1 ∪ {00}, where T
′
0 and T
′
1 are T0 and T1 in the original
construction of ω[A] renamed.)
The game is nonmonotonic since ∅ is winning but there are losing coali-
tions. It is nonproper since the coalitions {0, 1}, {0, 1}c are winning.
It is strong since its subset ω[A] is strong. It is nonweak by Lemma 1
since it is nonproper. The proofs of computability and nonexistence
of a finite carrier are similar to the proofs for ω[A].
15 (−−−+) A nonmonotonic, nonproper, nonstrong, nonweak game. In
the construction of ω[A], replace (2.i) and (3) by
(2*.i) for each p-string α′ that extends 1010 or 1001 and is a proper
prefix of α, if s = 0 or |α′| ≥ ls−1, then enumerate α
′ ∗ 11 in T1
and α′ ∗ 00 in T0; furthermore, enumerate d-strings 00, 1000, and
0111 in T0 and d-strings 11, 1011 and 0100 in T1;
(3*) if a string β /∈ {00, 11, 1000, 0111, 1011, 0100} is enumerated in T1
(or in T0) above, then enumerate β
c in T0 (or in T1, respectively).
The game is nonmonotonic since 0100 is winning but 0111 is not. The
game is nonproper since 1011, 0100 ∈ T1 imply that the coalitions {1}
and {1}c are winning. It is nonstrong since 1000, 0111 ∈ T0 imply {0}
and {0}c are losing. It is nonweak by Lemma 1 since it is nonproper.
The proofs of computability and nonexistence of a finite carrier are
similar to the proofs for ω[A].
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